US Monetary Policy Rules: the Case for Asymmetric Preferences by Surico, Paolo






This paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policy
analysis in which decision makers are allowed to weight di¤erently positive and negative
deviations of in‡ation and output from the target values. The speci…cation of the central
bank objective is general enough to nest the symmetric quadratic form as a special case,
thereby making the derived policy rule potentially nonlinear. This forms the basis of our
identi…cation strategy which is used to develop a formal hypothesis testing for the presence
of asymmetric preferences. Reduced-form estimates of postwar US policy rules indicate
that the preferences of the Fed have been highly asymmetric with respect to both in‡ation
and output gaps, with the latter being the dominant source of nonlinearity after 1983.
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11 Introduction
The last decade has been characterized by an increasing consensus in monetary policy analy-
sis. One of the most in‡uential paradigm has been the design of policy interventions as the
constrained optimum of a well-behaved control problem in which the central bank moves in-
terest rates to minimize some quadratic criterion. The latter de…nes the ultimate goals of
monetary policy and translates the behavior of the target variables into some measure for pol-
icy evaluations. When assigned with such a problem, the central bank faces the constraints
representing the structure of the economy. The quadratic characteristic of the objective and
the linear feature of the constraints give rise to a linear …rst order condition according to
which monetary authorities move policy rates as the optimal response to the developments in
the economy.
While the quadratic speci…cation implies that monetary authorities evenly weight positive
and negative deviations of in‡ation and output from the target values, such a modeling choice
has been questioned by several practitioners at the policy committees of various central banks
on the ground that it has little justi…cation beyond analytical tractability (see Blinder, 1997,
and Goodhart, 1999). The few notable exceptions include Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
and Woodford (2002, Ch. 6) who show that the quadratic form can be obtained as a sec-
ond order approximation of the utility-based welfare function. More generally, a number of
quadratic objectives have been recently proposed in the literature as a way to evaluate alter-
native targeting schemes and the policy recommendations have been implicitly drawn upon
the assumption of symmetric central bank preferences.1
Several recent studies however explore some novel mechanism through which the costs
of the business cycle can be asymmetric. Galì, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002) construct a
theoretical measure of welfare gap for the US based on price and wage markups, and show
that the costs of output ‡uctuations have been historically large and asymmetric. Erosa and
Ventura (2002) introduce transaction costs and heterogeneity in portfolio holdings in a neo-
classical model of the business cycle and …nd that those frictions make the costs of in‡ation
variation asymmetric. The psychology of choice suggests that people tend to place a greater
weight on the prospect of losses than on the prospect of gains in decision making under
uncertainty (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Then, mutatis mutandis, policy makers who
aggregate over individual welfare may be loss-averse with respect to both in‡ation and output.
Lastly, as argued by Blinder (1997) the di¤erent political pressures faced by the central bank
over the business cycle are likely to translate into asymmetric interest rate responses.
1See for instance Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Dennis (2002), Söderström (2001) and Walsh (2002).
2Despite of its intuitive appeal, only few studies have attempted to identify asymmetric
central bank behaviors and the relevance of this alternative framework remains to be assessed.
Chadha and Schellekens (1999) study the implications of nonquadratic loss functions in the
face of additive and multiplicative uncertainty, and …nd that asymmetric preferences are not
su¢cient to deliver a gradualist path of interest rates. Gerlach (2000), Dolado, Maria-Dolores
and Naveira (2002), and Martin and Milas (2001) show some international evidence that
supports the notion of asymmetric reaction functions. Ruge-Murcia (2002), and Cukierman
and Muscatelli (2002) study analytically the implicit functional form of a nonlinear policy
rule and conclude that the qualitative features of some G7 economy reaction functions are
consistent with an asymmetric objective. Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2002)
estimate an interest rate rule which is drawn upon the existence of asymmetric preferences on
in‡ation only, and …nd that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear reaction
function after 1983, but not before 1979.
This paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on optimal monetary
policy rules in di¤erent respects. First, assuming a fairly general speci…cation of both in‡a-
tion and output objectives, we derive a closed-form solution of the optimal monetary policy
within a New-Keynesian model of the business cycle. Since our objective function nests the
conventional quadratic form as a special case, the speci…cation of the policy rule is shown
to be nonlinear if and only if the central bank preferences are asymmetric. This condition
delivers a formal theoretical prediction which can be successfully tested for. Second, the ana-
lytical approach to the solution of the central bank optimal control problem allows to identify
the degree of nonlinearities and asymmetries with respect to both in‡ation and output gaps,
a result that to our knowledge of the existing literature comes as new. Third, a linearized
version of the model predicts that the monetary authorities respond not only to the level of
in‡ation and output gaps (as suggested by Taylor, 1993) but also to their squared values.
Fourth, reduced-form estimates of US monetary policy rules indicate that nonlinearity is a
robust feature of the data over both the pre- and post-Volcker periods. While this …nding
enriches the picture provided by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000), it suggests that the pref-
erences of the Fed have been highly asymmetric in both in‡ation and output gaps, with the
asymmetries on the latter becoming more pronounced than those on the former after 1983.
The road map of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and
derives the interest rate rule as the …rst order condition of the central bank optimal control
problem. The identi…cation method and the hypothesis testing strategy for the presence of
asymmetric preferences are described in Section 3. Reduced-form estimates on postwar US
data are reported and discussed in the following part while the last Section concludes.
32 Theoretical model: a New-Keynesian perspective
We assume that the central bank conducts monetary policy through a targeting rule according
to the terminology of Svensson (1999). Thus, all available information are used to bring at
each point in time the target variables in line with their targets by penalizing any future
deviation of the former from the latter. The policy rule is modeled as the outcome of an
intertemporal optimization problem in which decision makers minimize a given criterion under
the constraints provided by the structure of the economy. The optimizing device allows us to
reversely engineer the objectives of the monetary authorities, which are unobservable, from
the observed path of policy rates implying that evidence on the latter can be interpreted as
informative about the former. Since our identi…cation strategy relies on the estimation of a
model-based speci…cation for the reaction function, we challenge the assumption of symmetric
policy preferences in the context of a popular framework for monetary policy analysis. This is
a version of the celebrated New-Keynesian model of the business cycle derived in Yun (1996),
and Woodford (2002, Ch. 3 and 4), among others.
2.1 The structure of the economy
This subsection describes an aggregate version of the New-Keynesian forward-looking model
with sticky prices that has been recently summarized by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1999).
The evolution of the state variables is compactly represented by the following two-equation
system:
¼t = µEt¼t+1 + kyt + "s
t (1)
yt = Etyt+1 ¡ '(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + "d
t (2)
Equation (1) captures in a log-linear fashion the staggered feature of a Calvo-type world
in which each …rm adjusts its price with a constant probability in any given period, and
independently from the time elapsed from the last adjustment. The discrete nature of price
setting creates an incentive to adjust prices by more the higher is the future in‡ation expected
at time t. The in‡ation level is ¼t whereas the output gap is denoted by yt and captures the
movements in marginal costs associated with variations in excess demand. Equation (2) is a
log-linearized version of a standard Euler equation for consumption combined with the relevant
market clearing condition. It basically brings the notion of consumption smoothing into an
aggregate demand formulation by making output gap a positive function of its expected future
value and a negative function of the real interest rate, it ¡ Et¼t+1. Lastly, "s
t and "d
t are a
well-behaved cost shock and demand shock, respectively.
42.2 An asymmetric speci…cation of the loss function
An important aspect of monetary policy making in such a model is that policy actions are
taken before the realization of economic shocks and therefore before the state variables are
determined. Accordingly, the central bank objective is to choose a path for interest rates at
the beginning of period t conditional upon the information available at the end of the previous







where ± is the discount factor and L stands for the period loss function.
Our framework di¤ers from the conventional quadratic set up in that we employ a more
general speci…cation of the monetary authorities’ objectives. Indeed, the quadratic form may
approximate reasonably well a number of di¤erent functions and in the absence of a rigorous
theoretical foundation any speci…c nonquadratic proposal is destined to be unsatisfactory
against the wide range of plausible alternatives. Hence, rather than attempting to uncover
the correct functional form of policy makers’ preferences, we evaluate the symmetric quadratic
paradigm upon the empirical merits of the monetary policy rule that this speci…cation implies.
With this descriptive scope in mind, we write Lt as follows:
Lt =
e[®(¼t¡¼¤)] ¡ ®(¼t ¡ ¼¤) ¡ 1
®2 +¸
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The coe¢cients ¸ and ¹ represent the central bank’s aversion towards output ‡uctuations
around potential and interest rate level ‡uctuations around the target i¤. The policy prefer-
ence towards in‡ation stabilization is normalized to one and therefore ¸ and ¹ are expressed
in relative terms. The in‡ation target is ¼¤ whereas the parameters ® and ° capture any
asymmetry in the objective function of the monetary authorities.
The linex speci…cation in (4), which has been originally proposed by Varian (1974) and
Zellner (1986) in the context of Bayesian econometric analysis and introduced by Nobay
and Peel (1998) in the optimal monetary policy literature, embodies a number of appealing
characteristics. First, it allows for departures from the quadratic objective in that policy
makers may treat di¤erently positive and negative deviations of the target variables from the
reference values. This pattern is shown in Figure 1 which plots the standard quadratic versus
the asymmetric function for both in‡ation (Panel a) and output gap (Panel b).
The key di¤erence between the two speci…cations is that deviations of the same size yield
di¤erent losses. Indeed, under the symmetric scenario policy makers are assumed to care
5only about the magnitude of deviations whereas under asymmetric preferences they care also
about the sign. In particular, a positive value of ® in Panel (a) implies that, everything
equals, deviations of in‡ation (relative to target) from above are weighted more severely than
deviations from below. To see this notice that whenever ¼t¡¼¤ > 0 the exponential component
of the loss function dominates the linear component while the converse is true for ¼t¡¼¤ < 0.
The same reasoning holds for the coe¢cient ° in Panel (b), which captures any asymmetry in
the policy preferences for stabilizing the business cycle. However, if monetary authorities are
more concerned about undershooting potential output rather than overshooting it, the value
of ° would be negative implying that whenever y < 0 the loss rises exponentially whereas it
does linearly for y > 0.
Furthermore, the linex loss function speci…ed above is so general as to collapse to the
symmetric quadratic form for some parameter limiting case. Applying twice L’Hôpital’s rule
on (4), it is possible to show that whenever ® and ° tend to zero the central bank objective









The latter can be obtained as a quadratic approximation of the utility-based welfare function
in a New-Keynesian model of the business cycle that involves a zero lower bound for nominal
interest rate (see Woodford, 2002, Ch. 6). Accordingly, the policy preferences would be
functions of some primitive parameters of the model implying that potential evidence of
asymmetries in the central bank objective could be tracked into evidence of asymmetries in
the representative agent’s utility. Indeed, as argued by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1999), the
representative agent approach can be highly misleading as a guide to welfare analysis and it
is likely to be the case that some groups su¤er more in recessions or in high in‡ation periods
than others. This suggests that an asymmetric utility-based speci…cation of the loss function
may be a desirable representation of the social costs of cyclical ‡uctuations.
2.3 A nonlinear policy rule
We let monetary authorities choose policy rates in a discretionary fashion. Indeed, the case
for an optimal monetary policy without commitment seems to be closer to the actual practice
of many central banks which rarely tie their hands over the course of future policy actions.
Because no endogenous state variable enters the model, the intertemporal policy problem
reduces to a sequence of static optimization problems. This amounts to choosing in each
period the instrument rate such as to minimize:
Et¡1
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6subject to ¼t = kyt +ft and yt = ¡'it +gt where Ft ´ Et¡1
P1
¿=1 ±¿Lt+¿, ft ´ µEt¼t+1 +"s
t
and gt ´ Etyt+1+'Et¼t+1+"d
t are taken as given re‡ecting the fact that monetary authorities











¸' + ¹(it ¡ i¤) = 0 (5)
which is a closed-form solution for the optimal policy rule. Equation (5) implicitly describes
a general reaction function according to which the central bank moves policy rates as the
optimal, potentially nonlinear, response to the developments in the economy.2 The important
result which underlies equation (5) is that it nests the conventional linear form as a special
case. Indeed, it can be shown by means of L’Hôpital’s rule that when both ® and ° tend to
zero the reaction function (5) collapses to an implicit interest rate rule of the type proposed
by Rudebusch (2002), and Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000):
¡k'Et¡1(¼t ¡ ¼¤) ¡ ¸'Et¡1 (yt) + ¹(it ¡ i¤) = 0
This feature is attractive in that it delivers a joint restriction on policy makers’ preferences
which can be formally tested for. It follows that the hypothesis of symmetric loss function
can be challenged by assessing whether the relevant feedback coe¢cients are, either jointly or
marginally, signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The policy parameters ® and ° are indeed crucial
for the analysis of optimal monetary policy not only because they introduce an asymmetric
motive in the central bank objective function but also because, more importantly, they make
those asymmetries mapping into a nonlinear policy rule. This suggests that were ® and °
identi…ed, the hypothesis that central bank preferences are symmetric around the target could
be tested simply by evaluating the functional form of the feedback rule as the latter would
correspond to test whether ® and ° are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Hence, evidence of
nonlinearity in the policy rule would be informative about which type of asymmetry, if any,
is relevant to policy makers.
3 Econometric analysis
The parameters ® and ° and the exponential function govern the asymmetric response of
policy rates to positive and negative deviations of the state variables from the target. Our
task consists in estimating the nonlinear reaction function (5) in order to evaluate whether
2Notice that in contrast to other studies which impose an ad-hoc partial adjustment mechanism, our model-
based reaction function does not include any lagged interest rate terms. This comes from the fact that monetary
authorities pursue the stabilization of policy rate levels rather than changes, a feature which hinges upon the
speci…cation of the utility function of the representative agent (see Woodford, 2002, Ch. 6).
7those parameters are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This amounts to test linearity against
a nonlinear model, which is complicated by the fact that in small samples the estimation
criterion is insensitive to the so-called smoothness coe¢cients as there exists a large set of
®- and °-values yielding almost the same interest rate behavior (see Granger and Teräsvirta,
1993, Ch. 7). It follows that the asymmetric preferences would be inaccurately estimated,
thereby making the hypothesis testing for the presence of nonlinearities theoretically ‡awed.
Moreover, the speci…cation in (5) is nonlinear in the relevant parameters and therefore the
econometric method of estimation may pick up just one among the numerous local maxima
depending on the initial values of the coe¢cients.
A simple transformation of the model that confronts directly the issue involves the lin-
earization of the exponential terms in (5) by means of a …rst-order Taylor series expansion
around ® = ° = 0. The reduced-form policy rule now reads

















+ ¹(it ¡i¤) + et = 0 (6)
with et being the remainder of the Taylor series approximation.
This condition relates the policy rates with the expected future levels and squared values
of the state variables conditioned upon the information available at time t ¡ 1. We solve
equation (6) for it and prior to estimation we replace expected in‡ation and output gaps with
actual values. Accordingly, we focus on the following policy rule:
it = const +c1¼t + c2yt + c3(¼t)
2 + c4 (yt)
2 +vt (7)
which is linear in the coe¢cients















and whose error term is de…ned as
vt ´ ¡
(

















8The term in curly brackets is a linear combination of forecast errors and therefore vt is or-
thogonal to any variable in the information set available at time t ¡ 1.
Equation (7) makes clear that by assuming an optimizing central bank behavior the reac-
tion function parameters can only be interpreted as convolutions of the coe¢cients representing
policy makers’ preferences and those describing the structure of the economy. While recover-
ing all structural parameters is beyond the scope of this paper, a single-equation estimation
of the derived policy rule is all we need to identify the asymmetric preferences. Indeed, the
feedback coe¢cients c3 and c4 embody the relevant information such that the joint restric-
tion ® = ° = 0 implies c1 6= 0, c2 6= 0 and c3 = c4 = 0. Hence, testing the hypothesis
H0 : ® = ° = 0 in (5) is equivalent to testing the hypothesis H0
0 : c3 = c4 = 0 in (7).3 Un-
der the null of a linear reaction function, which fully corresponds to symmetric preferences,
the test statistics has an asymptotic Â2 distribution with as many degrees of freedom as the
number of restrictions. Such an hypothesis can be successfully evaluated through a standard
Wald test and since we are considering the auxiliary null H0
0 : c3 = c4 = 0 rather than the
original hypothesis H0 : ® = ° = 0, the statistics is usually referred to as Wald-type.4
While our strategy allows to identify the asymmetric preference on output gap, °, from
the coe¢cients c4 and c2 only, it does not allow to recover the other key preference parameter,
®, unless some additional restriction are imposed to the policy rule. Nevertheless, were c3
and c4 jointly signi…cant the hypothesis on symmetric preferences would be rejected. We will
return on the issue in the next section.
Lastly, it should be noticed that while the nonlinear quadratic terms in (7) stem from
asymmetric central bank preferences, we cannot exclude in principle that a nonlinear Phillips
curve be indeed responsible for any reduced-form evidence of nonlinearity. A simple way
to discriminate between nonquadratic objectives and nonlinear constraints is to perform the
REgression Speci…cation Error Test (RESET), which is designed to detect incorrect functional
forms, on the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. Accordingly, we estimate equation (1) on US
1960:1-2001:4 quarterly data using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with a 12-
lag Newey-West variance covariance matrix. The set of instruments include four lags of GDP
chain-weighted in‡ation, Congressional Budget O¢ce output gap, long-short interest rate
spread, and consumer price in‡ation. When the squares and then the squares and the cubes
of the predictions ^ ¼t are added to the original equation, the corresponding F-tests show that
3It is worthwhile to notice that the power of the test upon the auxiliary regression (7) crucially depends on
the signi…cance of c1 and c2 as it may be the case that H
0
0 cannot be rejected simply because c1 and c2 are not
statistically di¤erent from zero.
4As we are estimating a model which is linear in the parameters, the critique that the Wald test for nonlinear
speci…cations is not invariant to the parametrization of the model simply does not apply here.
9the null hypothesis of non-misspeci…cation cannot be rejected. This suggests that the US
aggregate supply curve is well approximated by a linear relation, thereby making asymmetric
preferences the most empirically relevant source of nonlinearity over the sample. Empirical
support for a linear US Phillips curve can also be found in Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-
Murcia (2002), and Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2002).
4 Empirical results
This section reports the estimates and the relevant tests of the policy reaction function (7).
The analysis is conducted on US quarterly data spanning the period 1960:1-2001:4. The
data set has been obtained from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and
embodies alternative measures of in‡ation and output gap. In particular, the baseline measure
of in‡ation is constructed from the (log) GDP chain-weighted price index while the one for
output gap is taken from the Congressional Budget O¢ce. As a way of providing a robustness
check, we also report the results for two alternative measures of the state variables, namely
the consumer price index in‡ation and the detrended output obtained as the residuals from
regressing output on a constant and a quadratic trend.
We divide the full sample around the third quarter of 1979 which corresponds to the
appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman. This lines up with a number of empirical
studies that demonstrate a signi…cant di¤erence in the way monetary policy was conducted
pre- and post-1979 (see Clarida, Galì and Gertler, 2000, Judd and Rudebusch, 1998, and
Dennis, 2002 among others). Moreover, we remove from the second sub-sample the period
1979:3- 1982:3 when, as documented by Bernanke and Mihov (1998), the operating procedure
of the Fed temporarily switched from Fed funds rate to non-borrowed reserves. Finally, we
address the issue of subsample stability by re-evaluating the model over the Chairmanship of
Alan Greenspan, 1987:3-2001:4.
The empirical analysis maintains the assumption that the model variables are stationary.
Although the null of unit root is often hard to reject, the well known low power of those tests
and the documented change of policy regime make it a reasonable hypothesis for the postwar
US (see Clarida, Galì and Gertler, 2000).
We estimate equation (7) over the three periods using GMM with an optimal weighting
matrix that accounts for possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms
(see Hansen, 1982). In practice, we employ a four lag Newey-West estimate of the covari-
ance matrix. Four lags of the explanatory variables, the interest rates and the measure of
in‡ation left out from the regression are included as instruments corresponding to a set of 20
10overidentifying restrictions that can be tested for.5
In the absence of further assumptions our approach only identi…es the policy parameter
on output gap asymmetries, °, but neither the one on in‡ation, ®, nor the in‡ation target,
¼¤, separately. Since the focus of our analysis is on the former parameters, we impose prior to
estimation the additional restriction that the observed subsample average of in‡ation provides
a reasonable approximation of the target. This assumption, which is consistent with the
estimates provided by Judd and Rudebusch (1998), and Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000),
allows to jointly identify ® and ° while making the feedback coe¢cients free from ¼¤.6 On the
contrary, no additional restrictions are needed for our hypothesis testing strategy on symmetric
central bank preferences.
4.1 Baseline estimates
Table 1 reports the GMM estimates of the feedback coe¢cients as well as the relevant parame-
ters on asymmetric behavior for the baseline case corresponding to GDP chain-type in‡ation
and CBO output gap. The policy preferences ° and ®, which feature an asymmetric loss func-
tion, have the expected signs and they are marginally signi…cant throughout the table with
the exception of ® for the second subsample. A remarkable shift in output gap asymmetries
is observed between the pre- (…rst column) and the post-Volcker (second column) regimes in
that ° moves to an absolute value bigger than one in the latter period (we will return on the
third column in the following subsection). All feedback coe¢cients but the one on squared
in‡ation in the second subsample are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero and they allow us to
perform the crucial hypothesis testing of our analysis.
The …rst row of Table 2 shows that the null hypothesis of a linear reaction function, which
corresponds to the joint null of symmetric central bank preferences, is strongly rejected over
the two periods with the Wald statistics being much larger than the relevant critical value7
(disregard the last two columns for the time being). Lastly, it can be argued that potential
5Notice that because no lagged interest rate terms appear in (7) as explanatory variable, the error component
is likely to be serially correlated. This is more that a standard error issue as it implies a violation of the
orthogonality conditions stemming from the New-Keynesian transmission mechanism. We solve the issue by
removing from the set of instruments so many lags as to make the residuals nonsystematic. This amounts to
replace the …rst lag of each instrument in the pre-79 period and the …rst three lags in the post-79 period with
their own earlier lags. An F-test applied to the …rst-stage regression rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments.
6Indeed, under asymmetric central bank preferences the in‡ation conditional mean may be either below or
above the in‡ation target depending, inter alia, on the relative size of the policy parameters on in‡ation and
output gaps (see Nobay and Peel, 1998, Ruge-Murcia, 2002, and Cukierman, 2001, for a formal derivation of
this novel in‡ation bias). However, under the null of symmetric preferences such a bias disappears (i.e. average
in‡ation equals in‡ation target), thereby preserving the validity of our hypothesis testing strategy.
7The results are una¤ected by two robustness checks. The …rst uses F-versions of the Wald statistics as
opposed to the Â
2 variants which may be oversized in small samples. The second adds a cubic term for in‡ation
and output gap as implied by a second-order Taylor expansion of the nonlinear policy rule.
11measurement errors for the state variables are likely to a¤ect the point estimates of the
reaction function and most importantly the power of the test for the presence of nonlinearities.
However, Kuha and Temple (2002) show that measurement error in quadratic regression
tends to hide the presence of nonlinearities, thereby making stronger the case for asymmetric
preferences and suggesting that our estimates are better interpreted as a lower bound.
4.1.1 Comparison to other empirical estimates and subsample stability
It is useful at this point to compare our results with the empirical estimates obtained in
other recent studies in order to gauge their plausibility. In the pre-Volcker period, Clarida,
Galì and Gertler (2000) estimate a forward-looking linear reaction function with an ad-hoc
adjustment mechanism and …nd values of 0:83 for the coe¢cient on in‡ation (s.e.= 0:07)
and 0:27 for the coe¢cient on output (s.e.= 0:08). The signi…cant di¤erence comes from the
output gap parameter which suggests that neglecting the quadratic term, which enters our
empirical speci…cation with a negative sing, introduces a downward bias in the linear estimate.
Turning to a nonlinear speci…cation, Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2002) use a
Clarida, Galì and Gertler-type rule augmented with a generated regressor for the conditional
variance of in‡ation and estimate the marginal impact of in‡ation at 1:14 (s.e.= 0:12) and
the one of output at 0:31 (s.e.= 0:11). In addition to the downward bias for the output level,
their …ndings suggest that neglecting the quadratic terms introduce also an upward bias for
the coe¢cient on in‡ation level, which is consistent with the positive estimate we get for the
squared in‡ation.
The picture is completed by the post-Volcker estimates. Both coe¢cients on in‡ation
level and output level display di¤erences of expected sign relative to the values reported in
Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000) while they are consistent with those provided by Dolado,
Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2002). Lastly, we line up with early contributions in that
the coe¢cient on the in‡ation level becomes bigger than one moving from the pre- to the
post-Volcker era.
It should be noticed that as no lagged policy rate terms enter the nonlinear interest rate
rule (7), our estimates should be interpreted as long-run responses. Interestingly, they can
also be interpreted as short-run coe¢cients if one is willing to consider monetary policy inertia
as an illusion re‡ecting the episodic unforecastable persistent shocks that central banks face.
In this vein, Rudebusch (2002) use our baseline measure of in‡ation and output gap over
the period 1987:4-1999:4 to estimate with instrumental variables a linear forward-looking US
monetary policy rule which is all alike equation (7) but the squared variables. In order to
make our estimates directly comparable with those in Rudebusch (2002), we re-evaluate the
12nonlinear policy rule over the Greenspan sample. In so doing, we can also assess the robustness
of our results to subsample stability.
The estimates are reported in the third column of Table 1 and they reinforce the …ndings
obtained so far. Indeed, not only all parameters are statistically di¤erent from zero and take
the expected sign but also the coe¢cient on in‡ation asymmetries becomes now signi…cant.
The value of ° keeps growing over time con…rming a signi…cant shift in the Fed output pref-
erences across the pre- and post-Volcker tenures, while the Wald statistics rejects the null of
symmetric preferences with a value of 83:883.
Turning to the comparison to other empirical estimates, we observe that neglecting the
squared variables introduces once more a signi…cant omitted variable bias. In particular, the
estimates provided in Rudebusch (2002) read the parameter on in‡ation levels at 2:00 (with s.e.
= 0:66) and the one on output gap levels at 0:39 (with s.e. = 0:24). By contrast, the results
we report in Table 1 shows that the point estimate of c1 is signi…cantly reduced whenever
the policy rule incorporates a squared in‡ation term whereas c2 becomes higher whenever a
squared output gap term is allowed for. While part of the di¤erences can be attributed to
both the longer sample and the non-annualized quarterly in‡ation we use, our results seem
to suggest a signi…cant role for the nonlinear components of US monetary policy rules. Such
a conclusion mirrors the estimates by Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002) who, employing an
ad-hoc speci…cation for the reaction function over a slightly longer sample, …nd a positive and
signi…cant coe¢cient for the nonlinear in‡ation term and a negative and signi…cant coe¢cient
for the nonlinear output component.
4.2 Robustness analysis
We assess now in turn the robustness of our …ndings to alternative measures of in‡ation and
output gap. Table 3 reports the estimates obtained with GMM using, everything equals,
the changes in the consumer price index as measure of in‡ation. All preference parameters
on asymmetries have the expected sign. In analogy to the results in Table 1, the coe¢cient
° on output gap displays a substantial growth over time in absolute values, although it is
less pronounced than for the GDP chain-type in‡ation. All reaction function coe¢cients are
signi…cant but c4 in the pre-Volcker period, which translates into a nonsigni…cant value of °.
The asymmetric preference parameter on in‡ation is still not statistically di¤erent from zero
over the second sample. Nevertheless, the Wald statistics displayed in the second row of Table
2 show that the joint null hypothesis of a linear policy rules is strongly rejected over both
samples.
We re-estimate the policy rule(7) using GDP chain-type in‡ation and detrended output
13as measures of the state variables. The results are shown in Table 4 and they mirror those
of previous tables over the pre-79 regime. In particular, signi…cant values of the feedback
coe¢cients map into signi…cant values of the asymmetric parameters, which once more display
the expected signs. Turning to the post-Volcker period, a di¤erent picture emerges. While
the preference parameter ° is still negative and signi…cant and con…rms in absolute values its
growing path over time, the coe¢cient ® on in‡ation asymmetries takes now a negative and
signi…cant value. However, the relevance of the latter result has to be weighted by the fact
that detrended output may be not an appropriate measure of the business cycle.8
We complete the robustness analysis by introducing an interest rate smoothing argument
into the nonlinear policy rule to evaluate whether the Fed tendency to smooth policy rates
may turn out to be responsible for a seemingly nonlinear behavior.9 The estimates of the
policy preferences line up with those of the baseline case while the last row of Table 2 shows
that the null of symmetric preferences is once more strongly rejected over both samples. This
…nding suggests that squared in‡ation and squared output gap capture a genuine nonlinear
behavior and therefore they have a place on their own right in US monetary policy rules.10
4.3 Discussion
A number of di¤erent results stem from the estimates reported above. On the one hand,
the preference parameter on output asymmetries, whose identi…cation does not require any
additional assumption on the model coe¢cients, takes negative and signi…cant values. Such
an evidence is robust across alternative measures of in‡ation and output gaps being consistent
with an asymmetric speci…cation of the central bank objectives. In addition, the signi…cant
increase of ° over time appears to be a robust feature of the data corroborating the view
that a regime shift has occurred between the pre- and the post-1979 Chairmen. On the other
hand, the estimates on the in‡ation preference parameter, ®, take a positive sign and they
are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero mainly over the …rst sample.
These …ndings enrich the picture provided by Clarida, Galì and Gertler (2000) and indicate
that nonlinearity has signi…cantly characterized the postwar policy stance of the Fed. Indeed,
equation (7) makes clear that under asymmetric preferences the interest rate responses are
8Indeed, as argued by McCallum and Nelson (1999), not only the …tted trend displays a signi…cantly more
volatile path than the CBO time series, especially during the post-Volcker period, but also it does not capture
the conventional wisdom that output has been unusually high relative to potential in the mid-90s.
9Estimates of the reaction function and the preference parameters in the presence of interest rate smoothing
are not reported here to save space, but they are available from the author upon request.
10Surico (2002) shows that these results are robust to both a backward-looking structure of the economy à
la Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and to a nonparametric speci…cation of the central bank loss function. In
particular, the nonparametric estimates suggest that the nonlinearities found in US monetary policy rules are
consistent with an objective function that is both nonquadratic and asymmetric.
14not anymore time invariant but rather they depend on the level of in‡ation and output
gaps. Accordingly, large deviations of the target variables require vigorous movements of
policy rates whereas small deviations require only limited changes. This point is illustrated
in Figure 2 and 3 which compare our baseline estimates with those obtained using a linear
speci…cation of the policy rule (i.e. forcing c3 and c4 to be zero). The vertical axis displays
the interest rate responses (relative to target) implied by the estimates of the two rules while
the horizontal axis reports the actual movements over the Greenspan sample for in‡ation
and output gaps respectively. The graphs show not only that US monetary policy has been
signi…cantly nonlinear and asymmetric but also that large gaps have been penalized more
than small gaps with the exception of the negative deviations of in‡ation.
Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that only according to the nonlinear policy rule interest rates
have been lowered in response to both positive and negative output gaps with the former
mostly corresponding to the period 1997:1-2001:1. Interestingly, this observation is consistent
with the view that the Fed has taken advantage of the benign macroeconomic conditions of
the late 90s to accommodate the favorable supply shocks that the ’New Economy’ has brought
about.11 It should be noticed that the reversed U-shape policy response displayed in Figure 3
is a feature of the post-Volcker era only since over the …rst sample the relative size of c2 over
c4 is considerably higher in absolute value than its post-79 counterpart (see Table 1). Indeed,
while the squared term translates into a signi…cant asymmetric behavior also over the pre-79
sample, the coe¢cient on levels, which is now bigger than one, makes the nonlinear relation
between interest rates and output gap positive over the entire domain.
Lastly, a comparison of ® and ° across samples shows that output asymmetries have be-
come relatively more pronounced during the post-Volcker tenures. In particular, the presence
of highly asymmetric preferences on output seems to rationalize the sequences of downwards
movements through which the Fed has considerably cut interest rates during 2001.
5 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is twofold. At the theoretical level it derives a general closed-
form solution for interest rate rules when central bank preferences are asymmetric in both
in‡ation and output gaps, and the monetary transmission mechanism is New-Keynesian. The
speci…cation of the policy objectives nests the quadratic form as a special case and therefore
11Notice that by using the (CBO) output gap as opposed to the unemployment rate we have implicitely
speci…ed a time-varying target for the stabilization of the business cycle. Moreover, since the potential output
series is constructed upon revised data, the argument that a shift in the NAIRU estimates may have warranted
such a seemingly nonlinear behavior does not apply here.
15it translates into a potentially nonlinear monetary policy rule. This modeling feature forms
the basis of our hypothesis testing strategy for the presence of asymmetric preferences as it
allows to reversely engineer potential evidence of nonlinearities in the reaction functions into
evidence of asymmetries in the policy objectives.
At the empirical level this paper shows that US monetary policy can be characterized
by a nonlinear policy rule during both the pre- and post-Volcker eras, with the interest rate
responses to the state of the business cycle being the dominant form of nonlinearity over the
second sample. Moreover, our identi…cation method indicates that the preferences of the Fed
have been highly asymmetric with respect to both in‡ation and output gaps, and that the
asymmetries on the latter have become relatively more pronounced after 1983. These …ndings
are robust across alternative measures of in‡ation and output gap as well as to the existence
of an interest rate smoothing goal in the central bank loss function.
Altogether, this paper develops a formal hypothesis testing for the presence of asymmetric
preferences. As the null of the test features the quadratic form used in earlier contributions, our
results suggest some caution about using symmetric loss functions as a guide to policy analysis.
Indeed, promising strands of literature have recently emphasized that labor market frictions
and heterogeneity in portfolio holdings can make the welfare costs of business ‡uctuations and
in‡ation asymmetric. Along these lines, a stimulating avenue for future research is to derive
an utility-based welfare function within richer models of the business cycle in order to provide
a formal microfoundation for an asymmetric central bank objective. The proposal by Geraats
(1999) comes as an intriguing step in this direction.
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Table 1: Reaction Function and Policy Preferences Estimates
- baseline measures of inflation and output gap -

















































J(20) 8.947 9.299 6.111
Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in
brackets. Inflation is measured as changes in the GDP chain-type price index and
output gap is obtained from the CBO. Four lags of gdp inflation, squared gdp
inflation,  cbo output gap, squared  cbo output gap, the fed funds rate and
consumer price inflation are included as instruments. J(m) refers to the statistics
of Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a c
2(m)
under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions.20
Table 2: Testing for symmetric policy preferences
- Wald-type test of the joint null hypothesis a=g=0 -
W(2) 60:1–79:2 82:4-01:4
Baseline Estimates 72.400 34.383
Cpi Inflation 39.731 33.510




W(n) is the Wald test for n parameter restrictions, which is distributed as
a c
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis c4=c5=0. The latter is equivalent
to the original null of symmetric central bank preferences, a=g=0. The
joint null is rejected at the 1% significance level whenever W(2)>9.210
and at the 5% whenever W(2)>5.991.21
Table 3: Reaction Function and Policy Preferences Estimates
- alternative measure of inflation -


































Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported
in brackets. Inflation is measured as changes in the consumer price index and
output gap is obtained from the CBO. Four lags of cpi inflation, squared cpi
inflation, cbo output gap, squared cbo output gap, the fed funds rate and gdp
chain-type inflation are included as instruments. J(m) refers to the statistics
of Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a
c
2(m) under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions.22
Table 4: Reaction Function and Policy Preferences Estimates
- alternative measure of output gap -


































Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported
in brackets. Inflation is measured as changes in the GDP chain-type price
index and output gap is obtained from regressing output on a constant and a
quadratic trend. Four lags of gdp inflation, squared gdp inflation, detrended
output gap, squared detrended output gap, the fed funds rate and consumer
price inflation are included as instruments. J(m) refers to the statistics of
Hansen’s test for  m  overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a
c
2(m) under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions.2324
The linear policy rule, it = const + c1(pt - p*) + c2 yt +nt , has been estimated with GMM using all
instruments employed for the baseline case but the squared variables. The estimates are const =
5.694 with s.e. = 0.128, c1 = 1.529 with s.e. = 0.112 and c2 = 0.694 with  s.e. = 0.057. The
deviation from inflation target refers to the actual values of GDP chain-type index inflation
observed over the period 1987:3 – 2001:4 using the sample mean, 2.423, as the target value.
The linear policy rule, it = const + c1(pt - p*) + c2 yt +nt , has been estimated with GMM using all
instruments employed for the baseline case but the squared variables. The estimates are const =
5.694 with s.e. = 0.128, c1 = 1.529 with s.e. = 0.112 and c2 = 0.694 with  s.e. = 0.057. The
deviation from potential output refers to the actual values of the Congressional Budget Office
Series observed over the period 1987:3 – 2001:4.